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I.1.  A Story
“Welcome to Geyser Intergalactic Park”. Despite the fact that you have been planning this trip for some time now, you realize as you enter the park that you actually know very little about geysers. You know that at some time a geyser starts shooting liquid, and at some time later it stops, but you know nothing about how long that process lasts. While reflecting on what your prior probability distribution over the temporal length of such a process is, you wander around the park, and eventually find yourself in front of a shooting geyser. Just as you begin to wonder how long this geyser has been shooting for, you see a sign adjacent to the geyser. It says “This geyser has been shooting for” and there is an advancing digital stopwatch underneath, which currently reads “10 minutes.” Looking around, you notice a second geyser nearby, with another sign and stopwatch: “This geyser has been shooting for 10 years.”
	Now, if you hadn’t seen the signs, your guess for how long the two geysers would continue to shoot would be the same. But it seems natural to take the signs to give you some evidence regarding how long the geysers will continue to shoot. If you stood around for a few minutes and the first geyser you saw stopped shooting, you wouldn’t be surprised – after all, it just started shooting a few minutes before. But if you stood around for a few minutes and the second geyser stopped shooting, you would be surprised – it had been shooting for years, and you were lucky enough to come at just the right time to witness the end! 
	So if you had to guess, you should guess that the second geyser will continue to shoot for a longer time than the first geyser will continue to shoot. Put more precisely, your probability distribution over future durations for the second geyser should have more weight on longer time intervals than your probability distribution over future durations for the first geyser. Without seeing the stopwatches, your probability distribution over future durations for the two geysers would have been the same, but the information about present age produces a probability shift. 
	We will call this shift a Gott-like shift, in honor of physicist J. Richard Gott, who (as far as we know) was the first person to provide a general argument that the present age of a process is an indicator of future duration: the greater the present age, the more likely a longer future duration. While we disagree with some of the details of Gott’s reasoning, we think the crucial insight is correct. The goal of this paper is to carefully examine Gott’s argument, both to highlight its (underappreciated) virtues and to explain its problems. In doing so we will defend the basic idea that that in many circumstances present age is an indicator of future duration.

I.2.  Gott’s Argument
Gott​[1]​ begins what he calls the “delta t argument” as follows, where tbegin is the time at which the phenomenon whose lifetime we are interested in begins, and tend the time when it ends:
Assuming that whatever we are measuring can be observed only in the interval between times tbegin and tend, if there is nothing special about tnow we expect tnow to be located randomly in this interval.
This is an application of the so-called “Copernican principle” that (in the absence of evidence to the contrary) we should not think of ourselves as having a special position in the universe. Gott’s argument continues:
If r1 = (tnow – tbegin)/(tend – tbegin) is a random number uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, there is a probability P = 0.95 that 0.025 < r1 < 0.975. 
Letting tfuture = tend – tnow and tpast = tnow – tbegin, it takes just a few lines of math​[2]​ to show that the consequent of the statement above is equivalent to
	(1/39) tpast < tfuture < 39 tpast (with 95% confidence).					(1)
We can apply this reasoning to the geyser story presented above. For the first geyser, Gott would assign probability 0.95 to the proposition
	10/39 minutes < tfuture < 390 minutes,
while for the second geyser Gott would assign probability 0.95 to the proposition
	10/39 years < tfuture < 390 years.
Thus, information about present age leads Gott to make very different predictions about the future duration of the geysers.
	Note that there is nothing special about the 95% confidence interval. The inequality 
	a tpast < tfuture < b tpast 									(2)
is equivalent to 
	1/(b+1) < r1 < 1/(a+1),								(3)
and hence according to Gott’s line of reasoning the probability associated with (2) is 1/(a+1) – 1/(b+1).
	The most well-known application of Gott’s argument is to the phenomenon of intelligent life on Earth.​[3]​ Intelligent life has been around for about 200,000 years, so setting tpast = 200,000 years, equation (1) gives (to the nearest year):
	5,128 years < tfuture < 7,800,000 years (with 95% confidence).			(4)
Gott’s argument is sometimes called a “doomsday” argument, presumably because it can be used to make a prediction for the end of intelligent life. Note that Gott’s argument is importantly different than the much-discussed Carter/Leslie doomsday argument.​[4]​ According to the Carter/Leslie argument, taking into account the present age of intelligent life should lead you to shift your probabilities in favor of intelligent life ending sooner than you had thought; the probability shift is always in favor of doom sooner. The Carter/Leslie argument is compatible with a wide range of personal prior probability functions. In Gott’s argument, by contrast, there is no room to input your personal prior probability function. (More precisely, Gott’s argument itself specifies the prior probability function; we will explain this fully below.) So if you are following Gott’s argument, then as long as you agree with Gott on the value of tpast, you get the result given by equation (4). 
	It follows that there is a sense in which Gott’s argument is more optimistic than the Carter/Leslie argument. For example, some people might think that there is almost no hope of intelligent life lasting more than one million years. If such people apply Gott’s argument, however, they will become more sanguine. 

I.3. Applicability
To what processes is Gott’s argument applicable? Gott has applied his argument to a wide range: examples are the Berlin Wall, the Soviet Union, Stonehenge, the journal Nature, the human spaceflight program, New York City plays, and even individual people. Gott has also applied his argument to non-temporal matters: for example, he predicts with 95% confidence that the longitude of one’s birthplace is in the middle 95% of range of longitudes of the country one was born in.​[5]​ Are there any limits to the applicability of Gott’s argument? 
	This point is worth addressing, because there has been some confusion about this issue in the literature. Carleton Caves (p. 144), for example, writes that Gott’s reasoning is “put forward as a universal rule, applicable no matter what other information one has about the phenomenon in question.” Caves puts the point dramatically: Gott “rejects as irrelevant the process of rational, scientific inquiry, replacing it with a single, universal statistical rule.” We want to make clear that this is not the right way to understand Gott’s argument, and, moreover, Gott makes pretty clear that this is not the right way to understand his argument. 
	To read Gott’s argument in the way Caves describes is uncharitable, because Gott’s argument is obviously flawed under that reading. There are all sorts of processes we come across where we know the future duration of the process. For example, if Brian comes across a colleague teaching a class on Monday at 10:45 am, Brian knows that that class has been going on for about 45 minutes, and will only last about another 5 minutes. It would be silly for Brian to apply Gott’s argument in that case. Now, one might think that the prediction Brian would make via Gott’s argument would be confirmed, since Brian would predict that
	45/39 minutes < tfuture < 1755 minutes (with 95% confidence),
and tfuture = 5 minutes falls within that interval. But in fact Brian could make many other predictions using Gott’s reasoning. For example, Brian could predict that there is a 50% chance that the class will last at least another 45 minutes, since
	45 minutes < tfuture <  minutes 
is equivalent to
	tpast < tfuture <  tpast,
which by equation (3) is equivalent to
	0 < r1 < 1/2.
Given that Brian knows that the class will only last about another 5 minutes, it is ludicrous for Brian to assign probability 0.5 to the proposition that it will last at least another 45.
	The lesson here is that Gott’s argument does not have universal applicability. Gott is well aware of this: he says that his argument should only be applied in cases where one does not have information about the longevity of the process in question. For example, Gott​[6]​ considers the example of exponential decay, of for example a radioactive particle. Gott makes clear that if you knew the rate of decay, then that would determine the probability distribution for tfuture “independently of the particular observed value for tpast in this case.” In other words, because one has information about the actual decay rate, the value of tpast is irrelevant in predicting tfuture. Thus, Gott is aware that present age is not always an indicator of future duration; whether it is or not depends on whether other information is known about the longevity of the process.
	Here is another example of Gott demonstrating awareness of this. Regarding the prediction for the future of intelligent life given in equation (4) above, Gott (in his 1993 Nature article, p. 319) writes: “Short of having actual data on the longevities of other intelligent species, [the prediction in equation (4)] is arguably the best we can make.” Gott recognizes that if we had such data, this could give us empirical information on the longevity of our species (and intelligent life descended from our species), and this empirical information might contradict the information given by Gott’s argument. Gott makes clear that, if we have the choice of basing our opinion on empirical information or the predictions of his argument, we should base our opinion on empirical information. 
	Thus, Gott’s argument is meant to apply in situations where we do not have empirical information about the longevity of the process in question. Elliott Sober​[7]​ gives an interesting criticism of the argument on precisely these grounds; we will now turn to a discussion of his criticism. Considering the applicability of Gott’s argument to species, Sober writes: “in the absence of data, we are told to follow Gott’s [argument]. I’d expect most biologists to say something different – in the absence of data, you should go out and get some.” It is clear from context that Sober is on the hypothetical biologists’ side. As far as we can tell, Sober is serious about this: in the absence of empirical data that goes beyond the value of tpast, one should make no predictions about future longevity. Sober says that Gott’s sampling assumption (that tnow is located randomly in this interval between tbegin and tend) is an empirical claim, which should not be endorsed a priori. Instead, Sober says, “all claims about the relationship of prior duration to longevity must be judged empirically” (his emphasis). 
	Sober’s dictum that, in the absence of empirical data, “you should go out and get some” is not that helpful. Gott admits that predictions based on empirical evidence trump predictions based on his delta t argument. Gott wants to use his delta t argument to make predictions for processes where one does not have empirical evidence. If empirical evidence were easily obtainable, it might make sense to follow Sober’s dictum instead of Gott’s argument. But Gott clearly thinks that there are some processes for which empirical evidence is not easily attainable, and that thought seems plausible. Also, even if empirical evidence is easily attainable, it still seems permissible to utilize Gott’s argument in the time interval until one gets the empirical evidence. 	 
	To see how extreme Sober’s stance is, consider the geyser story. Suppose that Sober encounters these two geysers, and stands around for a few minutes to see if they will stop shooting. Since, by assumption, Sober has no empirical information about geysers, he will make no predictions about when they might end. Thus, he will be equally unsurprised whether he sees the first geyser or the second geyser stop shooting. Note that this is the case regardless of how different the present age of the two geysers is. For example, suppose that the first geyser has been shooting for 10 seconds, while the second geyser has been shooting for 100 million years. Sober would be equally unsurprised to see the 100 million year old geyser stop shooting as he would be for the 10 second geyser. But imagine how amazed you would be to come across a geyser that has been shooting for 100 million years, only to have it finally stop shooting right before your very eyes! It seems counterintuitive for Sober to treat that experience the same way he would treat the experience of seeing the 10 second geyser stop shooting. 
	As far as we can tell, there is nothing rationally impermissible about Sober’s studied agnosticism, at least insofar as there is no logical infelicity in Sober’s position and he is not necessarily being probabilistically incoherent. It is an agnosticism that seems hard to maintain in practice, though, and it is an agnosticism that we do not share. If you share our intuitions about the geyser case, then you too should reject Sober’s agnosticism.
	To be charitable, we can guess how Sober would respond to our charge of counterintuitiveness. Sober would emphasize that, in the geyser story, by assumption you know nothing about the lifetimes of geysers. Thus, for all you know, almost all geysers last for slightly more than 100 million years, and only a very few geysers last for just somewhat more than 10 seconds. Also, for all you know, most geysers in the park started about 100 million years ago, so it is currently commonplace to witness the end of one. Thus, for all you know, it is the end of the 10 second geyser that is the unusual event. Since you don’t have any empirical data, you don’t know whether to be surprised at witnessing the end of the 100 million year geyser or at witnessing the end of the 10 second geyser. Sober would conclude that you should remain agnostic.
	Here is our response to this imagined defense from Sober. It is true that one possibility is that described in the previous paragraph, where witnessing the end of the 100 million year geyser is not surprising. But there are many other possibilities where witnessing the end of that geyser is surprising. It simply seems more likely to us that one of those later possibilities is the actual one – intuition certainly supports that, because intuition dictates that one should be surprised. 
	Here is our diagnosis of the central disagreement between Sober and Gott. Sober says that the disagreement arises because Gott is willing to make probability judgments without empirical information. But Gott could legitimately reply that he has empirical information; he has the value of tpast. What Sober really wants empirical justification for is the prior probability function Gott is relying on to justify his sampling assumption. Gott maintains that, in the absence of evidence, this prior probability function should be chosen a priori. We will now take up this issue regarding the justification of the prior.


II. GOTT’S ARGUMENT IS BAYESIAN
II.1. The prior
In the 1993 Nature paper where Gott first presents his argument, there is no mention of prior probability functions, conditionalization, or anything that would lead the casual reader to think the argument is a Bayesian one. But in fact the argument can be given in Bayesian form, as Gott explains in his 1994 Nature follow-up. 
	Let Ttotal be the proposition that the total longevity of the process in question is ttotal, where ttotal is tpast + tfuture. Gott assumes a prior probability function of
	P(Ttotal)  1/ttotal,
where  indicates proportionality. We will discuss this choice of prior below, but first we will show how this prior reproduces the predictions of Gott’s argument.
	Starting from this prior probability function P, the evidence that one conditionalizes on is Tpast, the proposition that the present age of the process in question is tpast. By Bayes’ Rule, the posterior probability P*(Ttotal) is given by
	P*(Ttotal) = P(Ttotal|Tpast)  P(Tpast|Ttotal) P(Ttotal). 
Given the specified prior, P(Tpast|Ttotal)  1/ttotal, as long as tpast < ttotal; otherwise the value is 0. It follows that 
	P*(Ttotal)  1/(ttotal)2, as long as tpast < ttotal.
To calculate the probability that ttotal is in some particular range of values, one must integrate the function P*(Ttotal) over that range of values, and normalize. For example, for the first geyser encountered, let T10total be the proposition that the total longevity of the geyser is at least 10 minutes. We know that this probability is 1, so this will allow us to establish the normalization factor. 
	P*(T10total)  10 1/(ttotal)2 dttotal
		      1/10 – 1/
		      1/10.
Thus, the normalization factor is 10. We can now verify that the prediction of Gott’s argument is reproduced, that the probability is 0.95 that 10/39 minutes < tfuture < 390 minutes. In other words, we are evaluating the probability of the proposition T#total that the total longevity is between (10 + 10/39) minutes and 400 minutes. 
	P*(T#total) = 10 (10+10/39400 1/(ttotal)2 dttotal)
		      = 10 (1/(10+10/39) – 1/400)
		      = 0.95.
We will leave it to the reader to verify that there is nothing special about this example; the predictions of Gott’s argument are the same regardless of whether one uses the delta t argument discussed in Section I.2, or whether one uses the Bayesian formulation discussed in this section.
	We will now turn to the justification of the prior probability function Gott chooses. The prior Gott utilizes is due to Jeffreys;​[8]​ Jeffreys recommends this prior for situations where we do not know the value of some positive but unbounded magnitude. As Rosencrantz​[9]​ points out, it is standardly thought that Jeffreys did not provide a compelling rationale for his prior; Jeffreys’s justification appears to rely on a discredited version of the principle of indifference. This makes salient the question: what rationale does Gott give for his use of the Jeffreys prior?
	Gott calls the prior he uses “the appropriate vague Bayesian prior”, but he does not give an elaborate justification for his choice. He does say that “it is hard to argue that we can produce a ‘smarter’ prior than this on the basis of speculation alone” but that it itself doesn’t constitute an argument. In fact, as far as we can tell, besides pointing out that his prior is often used and is endorsed by others, the only argument Gott gives is as follows: 
The vague Bayesian prior can be used by any intelligent observer. Its results are in agreement with the Copernican Principle. This agreement is not accidental – the appropriate vague Bayesian prior would be agreed to by any intelligent observer and if they all use it then the results, to be correct, must be consistent with the Copernican Principle (take a poll of all observers).​[10]​
This is an interesting argument. Gott is pointing out that there is a match between the Copernican Principle and the Jeffreys prior. For one who antecedently endorsed the Copernican Principle, this would provide a compelling justification for the Jeffreys prior. But for one who is looking for independent justification of the delta t argument, Gott’s reasoning here is circular.
	We believe that the strongest argument one can give for the Jeffreys prior is due to E. T. Jaynes.​[11]​ Jaynes proves that, if one is assigning a prior probability function to a positive, unbounded magnitude, and one wants the predictions one gets using the prior to be invariant under location and scale transformations, then one must assign the Jeffreys prior. 
	To explain this result, we will start by illustrating location invariance. Consider the encounter of the geyser that has been shooting for 10 minutes. If the predictions you make for how long the shooting will last depend on when you showed up, then the predictions are not location invariant. (Since we are predicting the temporal length of a process, “location” in this context means “location in time”.) For example, in the situation where you know that tpast = 10 minutes, if you would make different predictions based on whether it was Monday versus Tuesday, or nighttime versus daytime, then the predictions are not location invariant. 
	Now we will illustrate scale invariance. For the geyser that has been shooting for 10 minutes, Gott’s argument assigns probability 0.95 to the prediction that 10/39 minutes < tfuture < 390 minutes. Suppose that it turns out you misread the stopwatch; it actually said “10 years”. If you are unwilling to replace “minutes” with “years” in your prediction, while keeping the numbers the same, then your prediction is not scale invariant. 
	In the story of Section I.1, it is reasonable for your predictions to be location and scale invariant. Since we specified that you have no prior knowledge regarding the longevity of geysers, it is reasonable for your predictions to be the same regardless of when you show up at the park. Further, it is reasonable for you to make numerically the same predictions regardless of whether you are contemplating the geyser that has been shooting for 10 minutes or the geyser that has been shooting for 10 years. In the geyser example, then, the Jeffreys prior is  a reasonable choice, since it is the only prior that satisfies location and scale invariance. 	Nevertheless, the argument for the Jeffreys prior is not conclusive. There are many processes for which it would be inappropriate to make the assumption of location and scale invariance. For example, it may be inappropriate to make that assumption regarding geysers – it may be unrealistic to assume that one has no prior knowledge regarding the longevity of geysers. We will discuss this issue in Section III.2 below, and we will show that in many cases where it is inappropriate to make the assumption of location and scale invariance, a generalization of Gott’s argument is still applicable. 
	Before moving on to the next section, we want to discuss two concerns one might have about Gott’s use of the Jeffreys prior. As we will explain, we do not find these concerns moving. 
	One might be concerned because the Jeffreys prior is non-normalizable – the probabilities assigned to the various disjoint possibilities can’t sum to a finite number, like 1. But this is unproblematic, for two reasons. First, the posterior probability functions one gets from Gott’s argument are normalizable, so they can unproblematically be used to represent an agent’s opinion. Second, there are no technical barriers to dealing with non-normalizable priors – for example, they can be handled by the Rényi axiom system, where all probabilities representing opinions are conditional.​[12]​ Note that even though we are claiming that non-normalizable prior probability functions are unproblematic, this is a controversial issue; for dissent see for example Howson and Urbach.​[13]​ Below we will consider ways of modifying Gott’s argument to accommodate those who reject non-normalizable priors. 
	One might be concerned that Gott’s argument seems non-Bayesian, because each time one wants to apply Gott’s argument one starts from the Jeffreys prior. In a standard Bayesian model, by contrast, one utilizes an a priori prior probability function only once; the resulting posterior probability function becomes the new prior when one wants to conditionalize on more evidence. For example, consider the first geyser you encounter, where tpast = 10 minutes. Suppose that you wait around another 10 minutes, and that geyser is still shooting. At that point tpast = 20 minutes, and you apply Gott’s argument using the Jeffreys prior again. But what if, instead of simply applying Gott’s argument at the 20 minute mark, you took the posterior probability function generated when you applied Gott’s argument at the 10 minute mark, and then conditionalized on the proposition that the geyser is still shooting 10 minutes later? Will you get the same probability function regardless of which method you choose?
	It turns out that the two methods produce the same result, as we will now show. We will first consider applying Gott’s argument directly, and then we will evaluate what happens when one conditionalizes.
	 Let us establish a date scheme such that now, when tpast = 10 minutes, is the start of Minute Ten. The geyser started shooting at Minute Zero. Ten minutes from now, if the geyser is still shooting, tpast = 20 minutes, so Gott’s argument assigns probability 0.95 to
	20/39 minutes < tfuture < 780 minutes.
Let C be the proposition that the process will end between Minute (20 + 20/39) and Minute 800. Ten minutes from now, if the geyser is still shooting, Gott’s argument specifies the probability of C is 0.95.
	What probability does Gott’s argument assign to C considered from now (that is, when tpast = 10 minutes)? We must assign a probability to the inequality 
	10 + 20/39 minutes < tfuture < 790 minutes.
This is equivalent to
	(10 + 20/39)/10 tpast < tfuture < 79 tpast.
It follows (via equation (3)) that, considered from now, P(C) = 0.475.
	In addition to proposition C, there are three other propositions worth considering:
	A: the process ends between Minute 10 and Minute 20.
	B: the process ends between Minute 20 and Minute (20 + 20/39).
	D: the process ends after Minute 800. 
Applying Gott’s argument now, P(A) = 1/2, P(B) = 0.0125, P(C) = 0.475, and P(D) = 0.0125. Now suppose that 10 minutes from now, you learn that the geyser has not stopped, so you conditionalize on ~A. The probability of A drops to 0 and the probabilities of the other three propositions double (thus ensuring that the ratios between the probabilities for B, C, and D stay the same, this being a requirement of Bayesian conditionalization). It follows that P(C) = 0.95, thus reproducing the result one gets if one directly applies Gott’s argument. 
	We will leave it to the reader to verify that there is nothing special about the example we have chosen. We conclude that starting from the Jeffreys prior each time one applies Gott’s argument does not make Gott’s argument non-Bayesian. 

II.2. Inference to the best explanation
	There is a further respect in which Gott’s argument is Bayesian, one worth emphasizing. This consists in the fact that it is independent of inference to the best explanation (IBE). We’ll begin with this independence, then turn to why it bears emphasizing, and finally explain in what sense this contributes to the Bayesian character of Gott’s argument.
	As we have seen in the previous section, Gott’s argument works by beginning with a certain prior probability distribution for Ttotal and then updating with information about the minimum duration of the process in question. Whether or not such updating amounts to IBE will depend on the nature of the prior probability distribution. But the prior Gott utilizes – P(Ttotal) 1/ttotal – merely represents one kind of principle of indifference, viz., the one which satisfies location and scale invariance. Thus, the conditional probabilities one gets from this prior will fail to have the character necessary in order for the corresponding conditionalization to be treated as IBE.
	This bears emphasizing since, when Gott himself is trying to present his argument as intuitive, it can seem that he illicitly appeals to IBE. For one example, in applying his argument to the longevity of the Wonders of the World, Gott (2001, 218-9) writes:
The famous list of the Seven Wonders of the World can be traced back to approximately 150 b.c.e., the time of Antipater of Sidon. Two of the Seven Wonders (the Hanging Gardens of Babylon and the Colossus of Rhodes) no longer existed at the time the list was made, but five still did: the statue of Zeus at Olympia, the temple of Artemis at Ephesus, the mausoleum at Halicarnassus, the Pharos of Alexandria, and the pyramids of Egypt. Of the first four wonders that had each been in existence for less than 400 years at the time the list was made, not one is still here today. But the oldest, the pyramids, which were then 2,400 years old, have survived. Things that have been around for a long time tend to stay around a long time. Things that haven’t been around long may be gone soon. (emphasis added)​[14]​
Since applying Gott’s argument will lead an agent to 95% confidence in an interval for future duration which is proportional to past duration, Gott’s argument seems to receive intuitive support from this discussion. However, insofar as what he says is intuitive, that may be the result of a covert appeal to IBE. Take the lengthy past existence of some given thing like an Egyptian pyramid. The best explanation for this fact may be extremely sturdy construction or something else, but whatever it is, it is likely to be something which will make a lengthy future existence probable. The same cannot be said for the brief past existence of other things.
	Compare an IBE treatment of a schematic instance of enumerative induction: all 100 Fs observed so far have been Gs; the best explanation of this is that it is a law that all Fs are Gs; and this entails the mere generalization that all Fs are Gs. The final conclusion is reached in two steps, the first step being an inference to the best explanation, the second step being an extrapolation from the postulated explanation. The reasoning sketched at the end of the previous paragraph takes a similar two-step form. The first step is a highly general instance of IBE, which goes something like following: the best explanation of the lengthy past existence of the thing in question meets the description “a single structural feature of, or single process interacting with, the thing in question, itself durable or long-lived, which explains the thing’s long life so far”. The second step is then an extrapolation from this postulated explanation: this explanation makes lengthy future existence probable, since whatever in fact satisfies the description “a single structural feature of, or single process interacting with, the thing in question, itself durable or long-lived, which explains the thing’s long life so far” is likely to lead to lengthy future existence.
	Another example is Gott’s discussion of ship seaworthiness (p. 222). There he offers the recommendation, “To be on the conservative side, if you go to the dock to take an ocean voyage, don’t pick a ship that has not already completed at least 39 such voyages successfully”. But the intuitive reasonableness of this recommendation may involve IBE: whatever best explains the past 39 successful voyages is likely to lead to many more successful voyages. In a similar vein, one might suggest that the intuitions we solicit about our own geyser example have, at least partly, an IBE source. There may be something to this, but our point here is simply to get clear on the distinction between Gott’s official argument and IBE. Having made this distinction, we can further note that the predictions in question – about our geyser example, and about pyramids and ships – can all be accounted for via Bayesian reasoning which begins with the Jeffreys prior.
	So Gott’s argument, despite how his own discussion of it might lead one to suppose otherwise, is independent of IBE. How does this constitute a respect in which it is Bayesian? We recognize that IBE can be represented as Bayesian by suitably tailoring an agent’s prior probability function. But although accurate in certain senses, it is a psychological misrepresentation, since it represents what is psychologically an inference to the best explanation as nothing more than a coherence-preserving inference. Gott’s argument is different and, in that sense, straightforwardly Bayesian. An agent who applies it in a given instance is accurately psychologically represented as engaging in a coherence-preserving inference. The agent begins by treating no temporal location, and no scale, as special – the Copernican Principle, captured by the Jeffreys prior. The agent then leaves this state of indifference by learning information which excludes certain possibilities, with a resultant coherence-preserving realignment of probabilities which preserves indifference among the remaining possibilities.


III. GOTT’S ARGUMENT: ITS SCOPE AND LIMITS
Now that we have presented Gott’s argument in a Bayesian fashion, we will return to the issue of the applicability of Gott’s argument. We accept Gott’s appeal to Bayesian rules of inference, so the question of applicability boils down to the question: under what circumstances is that specific Bayesian framework applicable?​[15]​ For example, under what circumstances is the Jeffreys prior a reasonable prior to have? We will first argue that observational selection effects sometimes render Gott’s argument completely inapplicable. We will then show that, in many circumstances where Gott’s argument is not applicable, one can still apply a Gott-like argument to get predictions similar to the ones he makes. Finally, we will show that a purported refutation of Gott’s argument, due to Caves and Olum, is only relevant in some circumstances. 

III.1. Observational Selection Effects
Gott specifies that, to apply his argument, there must be nothing special about tnow; we must be able to treat tnow as located randomly in the interval between tbegin and tend. Gott points out that this requirement puts a limit on the applicability of his argument. For example, he writes: 
Don’t wait until you are invited to a friend’s wedding, and then, one minute after the vows are finished, proclaim that the marriage has less than 39 more minutes to go. You attended the wedding precisely to observe a special point in the marriage – its beginning. (p. 219)
While we agree that Gott’s argument should not be applied to this particular process, we would like to get more clear on why the argument can’t be applied. We will argue that Gott’s argument is applicable in some situations where one knows one has observed a special point in the process. We’ll then explain why Gott’s argument is sometimes not applicable.
	Back at Geyser Intergalactic Park, you run into a park ranger. Before you get a chance to ask her anything about the longevity of geysers, she says “follow me – Geyser #17 is going to start shooting purple liquid soon, and it’s quite a sight.” The ranger explains that exactly once during the time that this geyser is shooting, it shoots purple liquid. You follow the ranger, and get there just in time to catch the purple phase of the shooting; it is quite a sight. You notice that at the time that the geyser shoots purple liquid, the sign and stopwatch next to the geyser tell you that it’s been shooting for 30 minutes.
	Is Gott’s argument applicable to this geyser? We maintain that it is – or at least, we maintain that if the argument is applicable in general to geysers in Geyser Intergalactic Park, then it is applicable in this case. You start with the Jeffreys prior for the geyser, and then you conditionalize on the information that exactly once during the shooting process it shoots purple liquid. Since this doesn’t give any information on the longevity of the geyser, the prior is unchanged. You also conditionalize on the information that the ranger knows when the geyser will shoot purple liquid, but again that doesn’t give you any information on the longevity of the geyser. When you conditionalize on the fact that the purple liquid shoot happens at 30 minutes, this gives the information that the present age of the geyser is 30 minutes, but it doesn’t give you any more information than that. You have no information, for example, about whether purple liquid shoots happen early or late in the stage of a geyser, or about what sorts of geysers shoot purple liquid. Thus, Gott’s argument is applicable – to predict the longevity of this geyser, you start with the Jeffreys prior, and simply conditionalize on the proposition that the present age of the geyser shoot is 30 minutes.
	So Gott’s argument is applicable to this geyser, even though you have been brought to the geyser to observe a special point in its process – the point when it shoots purple liquid. So why is Gott’s argument not applicable to the marriage case? The reason can’t simply be that you have been brought to the marriage to observe a special point in the process. The problem is that the special point is temporally special – the special point is such that tnow cannot be treated as located randomly in the interval between tbegin and tend. 
	But why is Gott’s argument not applicable in cases where one observes a temporally special point? The reason is that in such cases, there’s an observational selection effect. Observational selection effects have been extensively discussed, going back at least to Eddington, with a notable recent discussion by Bostrom.​[16]​ The basic idea is that sometimes observations we make are biased due to a selection effect – we are only capable of making certain types of observations. For example, if we cast a net in a pond and catch only big fish, we might be tempted to conclude that all the fish in the pond are big. But if our net lets small fish go free, then that conclusion wouldn’t follow from our evidence. 
	To see the relevance of observational selection effects, consider an alternate version of the geyser story, where you show up at the park knowing that either all geysers shoot for 1 hour or for 100 years, but you don’t know which. The first thing you do at the park is take a tour bus ride, and you are brought to a geyser specifically to see it start to shoot. After 10 minutes, the tour bus departs. Should the fact that this geyser has been shooting for 10 minutes lead you to shift your probabilities in favor of the hypothesis that geysers just last 1 hour? No, it shouldn’t. The reason is that there’s an observational selection effect: you would have observed this geyser shooting for 10 minutes, regardless of whether it was going to shoot for 1 hour or for 100 years.  
	The point can be put in Bayesian terms: the posterior probability of the hypothesis H that the total longevity of geysers is 1 hour is given by the prior probability of that hypothesis conditional on the evidence E that you were brought to this geyser to observe it shoot for the first 10 minutes. In other words, P*(H) = P(H|E). But you got on the tour bus and were taken to the geyser specifically to see it start to shoot, and you knew that it was going to shoot for at least 10 minutes. It follows that P(E) = 1, and hence P*(H) = P(H); your probability for H is unchanged.




Above we discussed the example of how Gott’s argument should not be used to predict the future duration of a marriage if one is present at the beginning. Following the reasoning of the previous section, we can conclude that at least one reason Gott’s argument is inapplicable in that case is that there is an observational selection effect associated with the fact that one did not randomly come across this marriage; one was specifically invited to be present at the wedding. 
	This leads to the natural question: what happens if one does randomly come across a marriage, and the present age of the marriage is just one minute? Would it be legitimate to apply Gott’s argument to this marriage, and predict, for example, that there’s a 50% chance that the marriage will end in the next minute? 
	Clearly, this wouldn’t be legitimate. But why not? The reason is that we have information about the longevity of marriages; this information gives us a prior probability function for longevity which is not the same as the Jeffreys prior. At the moment that a couple gets married, one’s prior probability function is such that one assigns probability of almost 0 to the proposition that the marriage will last less than one minute. Thus, after one minute, when one conditionalizes on the proposition that the marriage has lasted a minute, this produces almost no change in one’s opinions regarding future longevity. 
	A marriage is not the sort of process to which it is appropriate to apply Gott’s argument, since the Jeffreys prior is an unreasonable prior to have for the longevity of a marriage. Sometimes, Gott says things which suggest that he recognizes this. For example, he writes: “My Copernican principle is most useful when examining the longevity of something, like the human race, for which there is no actuarial data available”.​[17]​ But sometimes, he seems to ignore this restriction. For example, he writes: “you can use the 95 percent Copernican formula right now to forecast the future longevity of your current relationship”.​[18]​ If his argument really were applicable to relationships, then one could predict for a couple that has been married for 10 years that there is a 2.5% chance that their relationship will last for longer than 390 years. This is clearly not correct.
	Nevertheless, for processes like marriages, it can be reasonable to take present age as an indicator of future longevity. When one comes across two couples, one that has been married for 5 weeks and the other that has been married for 5 years, it is reasonable to predict that the marriage of the first couple will not last as long as the marriage of the second couple. One’s predictions for future longevity change once one takes into account the present age of the processes, but the predictions are not exactly the predictions one would make by applying Gott’s argument. Nevertheless, because the probability shifts are such that the process which has greater present age is predicted to have greater future longevity, we maintain that such probability shifts are in the spirit of Gott’s argument. This is why we call them Gott-like shifts.
	The reason the predictions are not the predictions one would make by applying Gott’s argument is that one is starting with a different prior. This prior (unlike the Jeffreys prior) is arrived at through a posteriori means. The exact features of this prior would depend on the opinions of the individual agent, but there are certain features we would expect in such a prior. For example, for a marriage, it would be reasonable to assign probability 0 to the proposition that the marriage will last for longer than some long length of time, like 200 years. In fact, for many of the processes we encounter, it would be reasonable to assign some sort of upper cut-off. For example, our sun has a finite lifetime, and arguably that imposes an upper boundary for the lifetime of processes on Earth. Thus, it would be reasonable to assign probability 0 to the hypothesis that any Earth-bound process (like a shooting geyser) lasts for longer than, say, 100 billion years. The fact that we typically impose such upper bounds for prior probability functions for longevity entails that our prior probability functions are (at least typically) normalizable. This addresses the concern discussed in Section II.1, that the Jeffreys prior is unnormalizable. The prior probability functions for longevity that we actually use are similar in certain ways to the Jeffrey prior, but one way that they often differ is by having an upper bound.
	At this point the reader may wonder: what about Jaynes’ location and scale invariance argument which we used to motivate the Jeffreys prior? Our reply to that argument is that, for many of the processes one encounters, one does not endorse scale invariance because one possesses relevant empirical evidence. For example, for the geysers, it would be reasonable to endorse scale invariance in a limited way; it would be reasonable to make numerically the same predictions whether one is dealing with a scale of minutes or years (for a normal range of numerical values). But once one considers a scale of billions of years, for example, the upper boundary comes into play. If one assigns probability 0 to the proposition that the geyser will last for more than 100 billion years, then for a geyser that has been shooting for 10 billion years, one would not follow Gott’s argument in assigning probability 0.025 to the proposition that the geyser will last for more than 390 billion years. We conclude that while Jaynes’ justification for the Jeffreys prior is a beautiful result, it is not typically applicable in practice.
	In addition to Gott-like shifts, we should also point out that there are anti-Gott-like shifts: cases where, the longer the present age of a process, the shorter the future duration is predicted to be. This should not be surprising; lots of processes work this way. For example, consider life expectancy: for people past the age of infancy, the greater one’s present age, the shorter one’s future duration is predicted to be. 
	What this shows is that whether present age gives any information about future longevity, and if it does whether one gets a Gott-like shift or an anti-Gott-like shift, depends on the details of one’s prior probability function. For circumstances where one does not have much information about longevity, it would be reasonable to choose a prior similar to the Jeffreys prior, and hence the predictions one makes about longevity would be similar to the predictions one gets from Gott’s argument. But for circumstances where one does have significant information about longevity, the predictions one makes depend on the detailed information which is used to generate one’s prior probability function.

III.3. Does anthropic reasoning refute Gott’s argument?
Caves and Olum​[19]​ believe that, for processes where one does not have empirical information about longevity, one cannot use present age to make predictions about future duration. They maintain that Gott’s argument is flawed because Gott does not take into account how likely it is to come across a particular process. They argue that one is more likely to come across processes that have longer total duration, and once one takes that anthropic factor into account, present age gives no information about future duration. 
	Specifically, the Caves/Olum objection is as follows. (Our presentation of the objection is an improved version of that given by Olum (at pp. 175-6).) According to Caves and Olum, Gott’s prior probability function P(Ttotal) represents the probability that, if a process were chosen randomly out of all the processes in the class under consideration ever to exist, that process would have total longevity of ttotal. For example, for the geyser scenario, P(Ttotal) represents the probability distribution over longevity for all the geysers that ever exist in the past, present, or future. What Gott ignores (according to Caves and Olum) is that one is more likely to encounter longer-lived processes, because longer-lived processes are more likely to exist now. Caves and Olum thus maintain that the prior probability function for total longevity of all currently existing processes in the class under consideration, Pcurrently existing(Ttotal), is not the same as P(Ttotal). Instead a ttotal anthropic factor is required, which takes into account that the longer the total longevity of a process, the more likely it is to exist now. In other words, 
	Pcurrently existing(Ttotal) ttotal P(Ttotal).
Conditionalizing on Tpast, Bayes’ Rule establishes that the posterior probability is:
	P*currently existing(Ttotal)  ttotal P(Tpast|Ttotal) P(Ttotal).
Since P(Tpast|Ttotal)  1/ttotal as long as tpast < ttotal, it follows that 
 	P*currently existing(Ttotal)  P(Ttotal)
as long as tpast < ttotal. Once one incorporates the ttotal anthropic factor, one’s posterior probability function is the same as one’s prior (except for the information that tpast < ttotal). As Olum concludes: “we do not learn anything new from knowing the past lifetime, other than that the total lifetime must be at least as large as what we have observed.”
	We have three replies to the Caves/Olum objection. First, Caves and Olum illegitimately assume that the prior probability function Gott utilizes represents the probability distribution for longevity for all the processes that ever exist in the class under consideration. But we see nothing in Gott’s presentation of his argument to mandate that reading. Instead, the prior probability function could be taken to represent one’s subjective probability distribution for longevity for currently existing processes in the class under consideration. In other words, the anthropic factor could already be taken into account when Gott gives his prior probability function.
	So how can one decide whether the Jeffreys prior should apply to all processes, or to currently existing processes? There’s a sense in which there’s no right answer: rationality does not mandate that you utilize either approach to represent your prior opinion. But nevertheless, we have considered an argument for the Jeffreys prior: Jaynes’s location and scale invariance argument. Thus, the question becomes: does one maintain that location and scale invariance holds for all processes, or for currently existing processes? We believe that it is reasonable to maintain that location and scale invariance holds for currently existing processes – unless, that is, one has relevant empirical information; but even in many such cases, it will be reasonable to hold that such invariance holds approximately. For example, in the geyser story, both the geyser where tpast = 10 minutes and the geyser where tpast = 10 years are currently existing, and yet we argued that it is reasonable to make numerically the same predictions for the two geysers. It follows that one is applying at least approximate scale invariance at the level of currently existing processes. 	
	Here is our second reply to the Caves/Olum objection. Even if we suppose that our first reply to Caves and Olum is incorrect, all their argument shows is that there is a problem with Gott’s argument itself. This still leaves open the possibility of getting Gott-like shifts by conditionalizing on present age. To see this point, consider how Caves and Olum get their ttotal anthropic factor in the equation for Pcurrently existing(Ttotal). They are making a random sampling assumption, that processes in the class under consideration are randomly distributed through time. This random sampling assumption is in the spirit of Gott’s Copernican hypothesis, but that doesn’t mean that the assumption is correct. Just as one can have empirical information that renders inappropriate the use of the Jeffreys prior, so one can have empirical information that renders inappropriate the prior probability distribution of processes over time that Caves and Olum are assuming. This empirical information could make it inappropriate to use ttotal as the anthropic factor, and hence the anthropic factor would not cancel out P(Tpast|Ttotal), and hence it would not be the case that P*currently existing(Ttotal)  P(Ttotal) as long as tpast < ttotal.
	As an extreme example, one could have the empirical information that all processes in the class under consideration exist now. In that scenario, no anthropic factor at all would be needed, and one could reproduce the predictions of Gott’s argument. (Whether one reproduces the predictions of Gott’s argument in that scenario would depend on whether one uses the Jeffreys prior to represent one’s prior probability distribution over total longevity.) 
	A related example is given by Bostrom (p. 93). Bostrom implicitly rejects our first reply to the Caves/Olum objection, and writes:
in order to legitimately apply Gott’s method, you must be convinced that your observation point’s sampling interval covaries with durations of the phenomenon.
In other words, you must be convinced that, given that the phenomenon starts at tbegin and ends at tend, you can only make an observation in the interval starting from tbegin and ending at tend; you must be convinced that it was not possible for you, sometime before tbegin or after tend, to look and see that the process was not going on. In this situation, no anthropic factor would be needed, and again one could reproduce the predictions of Gott’s argument.
	These two examples considered in the previous two paragraphs are somewhat far-fetched. More realistically, one might have empirical information that would make the anthropic factor more complicated than the simple ttotal factor, without the anthropic factor dropping out altogether. As long as the anthropic factor doesn’t cancel out P(Tpast|Ttotal), the posterior longevity distribution is not given just by the prior. This provides more evidence for our claim that, even in cases where Gott’s argument itself it not applicable, present age can be an indicator of future duration. 
	Here is our third response to the Caves/Olum objection. Just as one can have empirical information that vitiates ttotal as the anthropic factor, so one can have empirical information that calls into question the claim that P(Tpast|Ttotal)  1/ttotal as long as tpast < ttotal. The assumption that no value of tpast should be favored over any other (as long as tpast < ttotal) is a reasonable one, in a situation where one is following the Copernican principle in treating tnow as randomly located
in the interval between times tbegin and tend. But one could have empirical information that would render inappropriate that random sampling assumption. For example, the empirical information could specify that one is more likely to encounter a process at some stages of its lifetime than at other stages. It would follow that it’s not the case that P(Tpast|Ttotal)  1/ttotal, and hence the Caves/Olum anthropic factor would not cancel out P(Tpast|Ttotal), and thus it would not be the case that P*currently existing(Ttotal)  P(Ttotal) as long as tpast < ttotal. Again, we get the result that even in cases where Gott’s argument itself it not applicable, present age can be an indicator of future duration.




We agree with the key insight of Gott’s argument: in many circumstances, the greater the present age of a process, the more likely a longer future duration. What makes Gott’s argument so fascinating is that one can generate predictions of future longevity based on minimal empirical information: the only empirical input is the present age of the process. 
	In practice, one often – perhaps always – has more empirical information than just the present age of the process. This empirical information can render the application of a location- and scale-invariant prior probability distribution inappropriate. But because we have shown that Gott’s argument is Bayesian, we know how to modify Gott’s argument when the Jeffreys prior is inappropriate – simply start with a different prior, and use standard Bayesian reasoning from there.
	One of the surprising things about Gott’s argument is that one can make powerful predictions from this minimal empirical input of present age. The most-discussed prediction of this sort is the prediction of our future prospects that Gott’s paper originally focussed on. In fact, some discussions of Gott’s argument exclusively focus on this doomsday prediction. The problem with this approach is that the doomsday aspect of Gott’s argument raises a number of controversial issues that go above and beyond the controversial issues associated with Gott’s argument in general. As a result, the merits and drawbacks of Gott’s argument itself easily get obscured. We have attempted to rectify that situation with this paper.  
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